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Abstract 
We explore the role of government initiatives fostering entrepreneurship—in the form 
of tax advantages and government support—in influencing the probability that 
entrepreneurial firms obtain bank credit and are not discouraged from applying for a loan. We 
propose that government initiatives fostering entrepreneurship should allow entrepreneurial 
firms to access more bank credit by reducing the risk incurred by lenders. We simultaneously 
estimate the probability of obtaining credit when a firm applies for a loan and the probability 
that the firm has been discouraged when it does not apply for a loan. In both cases we control 
for endogeneity. Our results are based on 18,872 observations (from the European Central 
Bank (ECB) SAFE dataset and Global Entrepreneurship Monitor – GEM) and show that 
government initiatives improve the probability of entrepreneurial firms obtaining bank credit 
but do not affect the probability of being discouraged from borrowing. The results also 
suggest that government initiatives fostering entrepreneurship are of most benefit to younger, 
smaller, high-growth, and more innovative firms that operate in contexts where the demand 
for, and accordingly the competition for, bank credit is strongest. 
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The current research investigates the impact of government initiatives fostering 
entrepreneurship on entrepreneurial firms’ access to bank finance. Access to finance is very 
important for every firm and even more so for entrepreneurial ventures (Block et al., 2018; 
Fraser et al., 2015)—characterized as firms that pursue rapid grow by leveraging innovative 
products, services, and processes (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Although it is often 
founding entrepreneurs, their friends, and family members who provide the financial support 
for the initial steps of venture creation (Berger and Udell, 2006; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 
2006; Winborg and Landström, 2000; Fraser et al., 2015), additional external funds will 
usually be required to release the full potential of the venture through facilitating rapid and 
sustained growth (Berger and Udell, 1995; Cassar, 2004; Mason and Harrison, 1997; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994). In fact, additional external funds foster entrepreneurial firms’ development 
opportunities (Eckhardt et al., 2006), because they enable management to pursue more 
ambitious strategies and allow for greater leverage than would usually be possible for firms 
lacking access to external funding (Ang, 1992; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). From the equity point of 
view, entrepreneurs can access finance via venture capitalists and business angels (Timmons, 
1999; Block et al., 2015; Fraser et al., 2015). These sources are widely discussed in the media 
and in the entrepreneurial finance literature (Denis, 2004). However, equity finance is not the 
only source of funds for entrepreneurial firms. Particularly, in the continental European 
context, banks are by far the most important source of funds for entrepreneurship (Heyman et 
al., 2008; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008; Revest and Sapio, 2012). Accordingly, research on 
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entrepreneurial finance should refocus on entrepreneurial firms’ access to bank finance 
(Elston and Audretsch, 2011; Garcia-Tabuenca and Crespo-Espert, 2010). Our research 
addresses this call. 
We explore the role of two government initiatives for entrepreneurship: tax 
advantages (i.e., fiscal measures that allow the firm to retain a larger share of its profits than 
the tax regime would normally permit to finance growth and expansion) and government 
support (i.e., grants, funds offered at reduced interest rates, guarantees, etc.) for 
entrepreneurial firms seeking to access bank finance. Drawing on recent work by Cumming 
et al. (2018) on spillover effects of government initiatives, we formulate two hypotheses, 
each covering the two actor groups’ perspectives on credit access. From the banks’ 
perspective, we look at the probability that following their screening process, banks approve 
loan applications based on observable characteristics of the applicant firms and the 
government initiatives available to support them. From the entrepreneurial firms’ perspective, 
we explore the probability that entrepreneurs will apply for a loan because they do not 
anticipate the bank rejecting the application because there are government initiatives 
available to support them; that is, that they are not discouraged borrowers (Bhaird et al., 
2016; Freel et al., 2012). 
To test our hypotheses on the impact of government initiatives, we simultaneously 
model the firms’ and the banks’ decisions using extended probit regressions (eprobit) that 
correct for both endogeneity of government initiatives and sample selection by taking into 
consideration that 1) banks can offer credit only to those firms that have applied for a loan, 
and that 2) discouraged borrowers can only be found among those firms that have not applied 
for a loan. Our estimations rely on the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises 
(SAFE) conducted on behalf of the European Commission and the ECB. The dataset 
comprises 18,782 observations collected from entrepreneurial firms between spring 2013 and 
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autumn 2017. The SAFE database details about loan applications and lending decisions. To 
capture the level of government initiatives for entrepreneurship in the different European 
Union member states, we combine the SAFE data with data from the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) conducted by Babson College (USA) and the London 
Business School (UK). 
The findings suggest both tax advantage and entrepreneurship support programs have 
a positive effect on the probability of entrepreneurial firms obtaining bank credit. At the same 
time, our evidence suggests government initiatives fostering entrepreneurship have no effect 
on the probability of entrepreneurial firms becoming discouraged borrowers. In addition, we 
find that tax advantages and government support are relevant factors in increasing the 
probability of accessing credit in a zone with a high demand for credit (Eurozone countries) 
while they do not have such an effect in countries where there is a low demand for credit 
(non-Eurozone countries). That is because in the latter the reduced competition makes any 
reduction of risk associated with government initiatives less relevant to banks’ credit 
decisions. We also find that the marginal effects are quite relevant (between 9% and 21% 
change in the probability of obtaining credit for 1% change in the GEM measure) and the 
economic benefit of these policies is greater for younger, smaller, innovative, high-growth 
firms. 
Our research contributes to theory, practice, and policy. First, it contributes to current 
research on the role of governments in financial markets by suggesting that government 
initiatives can successfully address the undersupply of entrepreneurship caused by market 
failure in the financial markets (Cumming et al., 2018; Guerini and Quas, 2016). Second, the 
insight that government initiatives can effectively reduce the risk faced by small, young, 
innovative, rapidly growing firms so that banks are more likely to provide credit, is an 
important contribution to the ongoing discourse in the realm of entrepreneurial finance. Our 
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empirical results contribute to the discourse on spillover effects of one source of finance on 
other sources (Cumming et al., 2018) and expand it to initiatives undertaken by governments. 
Third, our findings indicate that entrepreneurs should consider the governmental initiatives 
offered and the competition for bank loans in different countries when selecting where to 
locate their firm. Fourth, for policy makers our findings can guide the design of initiatives to 
support entrepreneurship. Support programs proved more effective than tax advantages, 
because they are more focused, more selective, and have a signaling role (Cumming et al., 
2018). 
The manuscript is organized as follows: Section 2 explores the literature review and 
develops four hypotheses. Section 3 explains the data used and the methodological approach 
applied. Sections 4 and 5 respectively present the descriptive statistics and the results, while 
Section 6 discusses our evidence. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development. 
Entrepreneurial firms typically present a high risk for business partners in general and 
for the providers of funds, such as banks, in particular. That is largely due to four 
characteristics of such firms. First, entrepreneurial ventures are more opaque than established 
firms (Ang, 1992; Berger and Udell, 2002). This stems from their limited capability to 
produce and submit the documentation requested by the banks since they tend to suffer from 
the liability of smallness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Second, entrepreneurial firms may suffer from 
the liability of newness: typically they are new/young and, accordingly, lack a sufficiently 
long track record to assist financial institutions to evaluate their creditworthiness (Berger et 
al., 2014, 2001; Kashyap, 1998; Moro et al., 2015; Tsuruta, 2010; Zambaldi et al., 2011). 
Consequently, lenders face agency and moral hazard issues and have to rely on alternative 
lending techniques (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2008; Berger and Udell, 2006, 1995; Degryse 
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and Van Cayseele, 2000; Moro et al., 2015; Moro and Fink, 2013; Petersen and Rajan, 1994) 
that cannot necessarily resolve these issues. Third, the innovativeness of entrepreneurial 
ventures in terms of new products, services, and processes increases the uncertainty about 
their future performance (Kreiser et al., 2013; Oke et al., 2007; Rosenbusch et al., 2011). The 
greater innovativeness of entrepreneurial ventures and the intense pursuit of research and 
development (Piga and Atzeni, 2007) brings the risk that new products, services, and 
processes will not perform in the markets as forecast and will not be able to generate the 
anticipated cash flow needed to repay the principal and interest. Consequently, compared to 
firms with well-established markets, product/service lines, and processes, the uncertainty 
linked to the innovativeness of entrepreneurial firms carries an elevated risk for providers of 
funds. Fourth, while some research finds that bank debt is not the most relevant source of 
finance for these firms (Heyman et al., 2008), the majority of empirical evidence indicates 
that the high growth rates that characterize entrepreneurial firms are typically financed 
through bank loans (Ang, 1992; Ang et al., 1995; Huyghebaert et al., 2007). Accordingly, the 
capital structure of entrepreneurial firms is characterized by the large proportion of debt 
finance (greater financial leverage) that, in turn, increases the financial risk (Hui et al., 2010; 
La Rocca et al., 2011). Overall, the joint effect of these four characteristics is to increase the 
risk banks must account for when providing loans to entrepreneurial firms. 
To mitigate the greater risk linked to lending, banks exploit different techniques 
ranging from the more formal (transaction lending) to the more informal (relationship 
lending) (Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1995, 1994). However, these lending 
techniques can only partly compensate for the information asymmetry and the related agency 
issues faced by banks so that the difficulties faced by entrepreneurial firms in accessing bank 
credit cannot be overcome. However, the constrained access to additional funds can 
compromise entrepreneurial firms’ ability to exploit their full growth potential (Beck and 
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Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). Overall, the issues new ventures face in raising the funds suggest a 
systematic disadvantage that results in a divergence between social and private costs. This 
divergence leads to less entrepreneurship in an economy than is socially desired (e.g., market 
failure, Lundström and Stevenson, 2005). Market failure (Rotger et al., 2012), curbs the 
potential for entrepreneurship to prompt innovation, job creation, growth, and structural 
change (Acs, 2006; Acs et al., 2018; Acs and Szerb, 2007; Baron and Tang, 2011; Timmons, 
1999; Wong et al., 2005). The threat of market failure thus triggers calls for government 
initiatives to foster entrepreneurship (Cumming et al., 2018) to grant society access to the 
positive effects of individual entrepreneurial activity (Bertoni et al., 2019; Cumming and Li, 
2013; Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012; Minniti, 2008) 
Given the strong political argument for fostering entrepreneurship with taxpayers’ 
money, it is no surprise that there are substantial initiatives supporting entrepreneurship 
across Europe; however, they differ in terms of both strategy and intensity so that in different 
countries initiatives come in different forms and on different scales (OECD, 2017, 2015). 
Lundström et al. (2014) provide a comprehensive picture of public spending on initiatives 
fostering entrepreneurship and find that in 2009 Sweden, Austria, and the Belgian region of 
Flanders spent 23, 21, and 21 euros per capita respectively, while Poland spent only five 
euros per capita. 
We argue that government initiatives fostering entrepreneurship that mitigate the risks 
facing entrepreneurial ventures can be expected to have a positive spillover effect on 
entrepreneurial firms’ access to bank finance by positively affecting banks’ lending decisions 
(Berger and Udell, 2006; Garcia-Tabuenca and Crespo-Espert, 2010; Hanley and Girma, 
2006; Cummings et al., 2018). The most common of such government initiatives are tax 
advantages (e.g., tax discounts and tax holidays) and government support (e.g., grants, 
guarantees, and funds). Both types of government initiative in support of entrepreneurship 
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tend to improve firm performance and thus reduce the economic risk entrepreneurs face in 
their venturing projects. 
Forms of tax advantage governments might offer to foster entrepreneurship include 
tax holidays for start-ups that extend for the first few years after establishment; accelerated 
depreciation of new assets purchased so that the tax burden can be reduced; a tax discount or 
tax holiday for firms investing in research and development; and a tax discount for firms 
reinvesting their profits. These government initiatives reduce the risk associated with 
entrepreneurial activity in several ways. First, by allowing the firm to retain a greater 
proportion of its profit that can be reinvested in innovations and growth, entrepreneurial firms 
can reduce their dependence on debt finance. The reduction of financial risk associated with 
reduced leverage can facilitate entrepreneurial firms’ access to credit when they require 
additional funds needed (Cressy, 2012; Romano et al., 2000). Second, an entrepreneurial firm 
having more cash available reassures banks that the firm will be able to repay any loans it 
takes out (Belghitar and Khan, 2013). Third, a tax advantage for entrepreneurial firms may 
increase the transparency and accuracy of the information generated. This happens because a 
greater tax burden may stimulate firms to implement accounting strategies that target tax 
reductions at the expense of the transparency and accuracy of their accounts (Guenther, 1994; 
Lin et al., 2012). Finally, entrepreneurial firms granted tax holidays should be able to reduce 
administrative costs because they have to spend less time on accounting and annual tax 
returns. Savings in administrative requirements allow for the allocation of extra resources to 
operations. 
We expect that generous tax advantages for entrepreneurial firms would have positive 
spillover effects (Cummings et al, 2018) on banks’ and firms managements’ loan decisions. 
Banks may be more likely to provide loans to entrepreneurial firms backed by tax advantages 
because of the reduced financial risks, their increased liquidity, and owing to the enhanced 
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transparency and accuracy of their accounts. At the same time, the management of 
entrepreneurial firms should anticipate the reduced entrepreneurial risk flowing from 
generous tax advantages and reduced administrative requirements. Management should 
therefore be less concerned that banks will turn down their loan applications. In regions 
offering entrepreneurial firms generous tax advantages, entrepreneurs should be less likely to 
be discouraged from applying for a bank loan than those operating in areas with less 
advantageous tax regimes (Bhaird et al., 2016; Freel et al., 2012). To test these effects, we 
propose the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The greater the tax advantage fostering entrepreneurship, the greater 
the probability that an entrepreneurial firm will obtain a loan from a bank if it applies 
for one. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The greater the tax advantage fostering entrepreneurship, the lower 
the probability that an entrepreneurial firm does not apply for a loan because its 
management was discouraged from applying for one. 
 
Direct support measures for entrepreneurial firms available to government include 
financial support schemes in the form of guarantees to facilitate access to credit for firms 
unable to offer sufficient collateral; grants to support research and development or the launch 
of new products/services; loans at discounted interest rates; contributions to reduce the cost 
of bank loans, etc. (Garcia-Tabuenca and Crespo-Espert, 2010; Posey and Reichert, 2011; 
Zecchini and Ventura, 2009). The effect of these programs is to enhance the financial 
performance of entrepreneurial firms (Bertoni et al., 2019; Fraser et al., 2015): First, because 
government support enhances the certainty of cash flows that the firm will be able to 
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generate, banks are reassured about entrepreneurial firms’ ability to pay the principal sum 
and interest; and second, government guarantees reduce banks’ exposure to the risk of a loan 
default (Garcia-Tabuenca and Crespo-Espert, 2010). Accordingly, we expect that government 
providing strong support to entrepreneurial firms would spur positive spillover effects 
(Cumming et al., 2018) on banks’ and firms managements’ loan decisions. Banks should 
reflect the reduced risk of lending to enterprises supported by government programs by 
providing loans to those ventures; at the same time, the management of entrepreneurial firms 
should anticipate the reduced entrepreneurial risk and be less concerned that their firms will 
be refused loans by the banks. To test these effects, we propose the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The stronger the government support for entrepreneurship, the 
greater the probability that an entrepreneurial firm will obtain a loan from a bank if 
it applies for one. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The stronger the government support for entrepreneurship, the lower 
will be the probability that an entrepreneurial firm does not apply for a loan because 
its management feels discouraged from applying for one. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
Our analysis relies primarily on data obtained from the SAFE survey conducted on 
behalf of the European Commission and the ECB, which is an ongoing survey gathering 
information about firms’ access to finance within the European Union and has been 
conducted since 2009. We rely on the annual round of data collection (in the fall of each 
year) as this includes a sample of firms from the entire European Union. Firms in the sample 
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were randomly selected from the Dun & Bradstreet database. The sample is stratified by 
firm-size class, economic activity, and country. The sample size for each economic activity 
was chosen to guarantee satisfactory representation across the four largest industry sectors: 
manufacturing, construction, trade, and services. Agriculture, forestry, fishing, financial 
intermediation, public administration, activities of households, extra-territorial organizations, 
as well as non-profit and holding companies are excluded from the sample. In addition, the 
sample sizes were selected based on representation at the country level. The specific 
individual surveyed in each firm was a top-level executive and the questionnaire was 
administered in the main local language. Between 500 and 1,000 firms were interviewed in 
the annual round of data collection we rely upon. The original dataset contains 49,400 
observations and that number reduced to 18,872 when we limited the dataset to 
entrepreneurial firms, defined as those firms that reported introducing new or improved 
products, or production processes, or organizational processes, or new ways of selling their 
products/services in the previous 12 months and/or rapidly grew during the previous period. 
We combine the SAFE dataset with information from Eurostat in order to have homogeneous 
data on GDP growth to control for macroeconomic conditions. 
Data on the government initiatives comes from GEM that began to collect data in 
1999 as a joint project between Babson College (USA) and London Business School (UK). 
The aim of the project is to collect data to explore why some countries have higher levels of 
entrepreneurship than others. The GEM survey data provides information about 
entrepreneurial intention, behavior, and the attitudes of individuals as well as on the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. Our research relies on data on this last area. 
3.2 Methodology 
When analyzing survey data, it is often the case that one variable is observable only in 
a self-selected subsample of respondents. In the case of the borrower–lender relationship, 
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only individuals who borrow can default on loans and thus create the risk that banks must 
evaluate in their lending decisions. However, in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the 
probability of default and thus the probability of successfully obtaining a loan, it is also 
necessary to model the antecedent determinants of a successful loan application (Greene, 
1998). Therefore, both aspects must be studied together, because the analysis of the 
probability of obtaining credit is made on a sample that is not randomly selected, as only 
individuals with certain characteristics have applied for loans. The same reasoning applies to 
the probability of being discouraged from applying for a loan, because it applies only to those 
firms that decided not to submit a loan application. In other words, the hypotheses under 
study must be tested using a subsample of firms that is not randomly selected. 
Such problems can be studied within a bivariate probit with a sample selection setting 
(Greene, 2003, 710-714). In the most general terms, that entails two probit regressions with 
binary dependent variables: 
 𝑦1 = 1[𝑥1𝛽 + 𝜖1 > 0]          (1) 𝑦2 = 1[𝑥2𝛿 + 𝜖2 > 0] 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1 = 1       (2), 
 
where 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 are explanatory variables and the error terms are bivariate normally 
distributed (𝜖1, 𝜖2)~BVN(0,1) with 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜖1, 𝜖2 | 𝑥1, 𝑥2) = 𝜌. Here, 𝑦1 denotes the selection 
variable. There are three types of observed outcomes in the sample whose unconditional 
probabilities are denoted as follows: 




with Φ and Φ2 denoting the univariate and bivariate normal cumulative distribution functions 
respectively. The coefficients 𝛽, 𝛿 and 𝜌 are jointly estimated by maximizing the following 
log-likelihood function: 
 
𝑳 = ∑ 𝐥𝐧 (𝑦1=1,𝑦2=0 Φ2(𝑥1𝛽, −𝑥2𝛿, −𝜌) + ∑ 𝐥𝐧 (𝑦1=1,𝑦2=1 Φ2(𝑥1𝛽, 𝑥2𝛿, 𝜌) + ∑ 𝐥𝐧 (𝑦1=0 𝚽(𝑥1𝛽) (6) 
 
Accordingly, the sample selection problem is solved by the specification of the 
likelihood function and will be different from the two-step Heckit procedure applied in the 
instance of a continuous dependent variable (Heckman, 1979). This implies that there is no 
need to calculate and include the inverse Mill’s ratio in the equation of 𝑦2 (Piga and Atzeni, 
2007; Piga and Vivarelli, 2004). 
In our setting, we apply this approach to study two pairs of dependent variables, the 
first of which is modeled as follows: 
 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1[𝛼 + 𝐸𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝐹𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝜖1𝑖 > 0]     (7) 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡|𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡=1 = 1[𝛼 +  𝐸𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝜖2𝑖 > 0].   (8) 
 
The selection variable, 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡, denotes whether firm i in country j has submitted a 
loan application in year t. The other dependent variable, 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡, identifies whether a firm 
has obtained credit when it has applied for a loan (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡). Among the set of explanatory 
variables, a vector 𝐸𝑗𝑡 of government initiatives in country j at time t is derived from the 
GEM database. The separate vectors of firm’s characteristics at time t, 𝐹𝑖𝑡 originate from 




The second model under analysis is specified as: 
 𝑁𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 1[𝛼 + 𝐸𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝐹𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝜈1𝑖 > 0]      (9) 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡|𝑁𝑜_𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡=1 = 1[𝛼 + 𝐸𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝜈2𝑖 > 0]    (10) 
 
The selection variable, 𝑁𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡, denotes whether firm i in country j has chosen 
not to apply for a loan in year t. The other dependent variable, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡, identifies 
those firms that reported being discouraged was the main reason for not applying for a loan. 
The explanatory variables in the second model are as described above. 
We cannot rule out our regressions suffering from endogeneity. To address this issue, 
we estimate our models by instrumenting the independent variables for government 
initiatives with the debt to GDP ratio of a country and with the inflation rate. High/low values 
of debt to GDP ratio are likely to hinder/enhance a country’s ability to engage in initiatives 
fostering entrepreneurship. The lower the debt/GDP ratio, the greater the opportunity for the 
country to expand public spending and, thus, to increase the support to entrepreneurial firms. 
The higher the debt to GDP ratio, the greater the constraints on public spending will be and 
thus the opportunity for the country to support entrepreneurial firms will reduce accordingly. 
This effect is even more important in Eurozone countries because member states are bound 
by common spending parameters that restrict governmental initiatives. 
Inflation can be interpreted as a measure of whether the economy is growing as 
planned by governments and central banks. Accordingly, the government of a country 
sustaining an inflation rate at the upper end of the ECB recommended level will be concerned 
with overheating the economy and will be reluctant to provide a high level of support to 
entrepreneurial firms and may even opt to curtail initiatives previously implemented. Lower 
inflation will in turn tend to spur governments to stimulate the expansion of the economy, a 
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process likely to involve supporting entrepreneurship. The two variables above affect the 
variables of interest, but they are not supposed to affect a single firm’s financial strategy. In 
other words, these two variables can perturbate our variable of interest, but they are not 
correlated with the error term of the regression that estimates the probability of obtaining 
credit. Because our econometric approach does not allow for the implementation of standard 
test procedures to assess the quality of the instruments, we use an alternative test procedure 
that is based on the work of Grilli and Murtinu (2018) as is discussed below. 
The bivariate probit with sample selection and endogenous regressors is estimated 
using a command, eprobit, that is part of the suite of extended regression methods that was 
introduced in the Stata15 software package (Roodman, 2011). 
The entrepreneurial ecosystem differs at the country level. This can generate 
clustering effects on the errors of the regressions. Accordingly, we estimate standard errors 
that are robust to the clustering of errors by considering different country clusters (applied to 
28 countries). Because the dataset provides weights that restore the proportions of the 
economic weight (in terms of the number of employees) of each firm-size class, economic 
activity, and country, we estimate our regressions by including those weights. We estimate a 
set of different regressions, where we enter the 𝐸𝑗𝑡 independent variables one at a time. This 
approach avoids potential multicollinearity problems among the GEM variables. 
We also implement some additional tests. First, given the significant differences in 
demand for credit among member countries of the European Union that have adopted the 
Euro currency (here, Eurozone countries) and those that have not (here non-Eurozone 
countries), we re-estimate our model separately for subsamples covering those two contexts 




Furthermore, the marginal effect of government support and tax advantages on the 
probability of access to credit is calculated by breaking it down for different age and size 
classes and also by splitting our data into groups according to firm growth rate and the firms’ 
innovation approach. We perform this analysis by exploring the effect in countries according 
to the quartile they belong to. Doing so allows us to explore whether a friendlier tax 
system/greater government support affects firms with different characteristics in different 
ways, and in that case, which groups benefit most. Government initiatives for 
entrepreneurship are expected to be of greater benefit to smaller, younger, faster-growing, 
and more innovative firms. In addition, by exploring the effect in different quartiles, we can 
examine the difference in terms of access to credit according to the intensity of the support 
the countries provide. 
3.3 Dependent Variables 
To explore the link between government initiatives and the demand for credit, we rely 
on the question in the SAFE dataset on whether a firm has applied for a loan in the last six 
months. We use the answer (the firm applied for a loan = 1; the firm did not apply for a loan 
= 0) as our first dependent variable (regression to estimate Equation 7). In order to examine 
the probability that firms obtain credit (regression to estimate Equation 8), we rely on the 
questions asked in SAFE to determine whether a firm obtained the credit it applied for in the 
previous six months. We use the answer to this question (the firm obtained credit = 1; the 
firm did not obtain credit = 0) as our second dependent variable. However, firms might not 
even have the opportunity to secure credit if they decided not to apply for fear of being 
rejected by the bank (discouraged borrowers): Such firms suffer from a lack of access to 
credit owing to self-selection. The SAFE dataset also collects information on this aspect 
when asking of a firm that did not apply for a loan if that was because the management was 
discouraged from doing so; that is, if management anticipated the bank would have rejected 
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the credit application. We use the reciprocal of the first dependent variable (firms that do not 
apply for a loan =1; firms that apply for a loan = 0) and the answer to the question that 
identifies discouraged borrowers (the firm is a discouraged borrower = 1; the firm is not a 
discouraged borrower = 0) as our third and fourth dependent variable in order to estimate 
Equations 9 and 10 respectively. 
3.4 Independent Variables 
We use two different independent variables to test our hypotheses. The first variable, 
tax advantages, is a score that measures fiscal measures introduced by government to support 
entrepreneurship. It is defined as “the extent to which public policies support 
entrepreneurship—taxes or regulations are either size-neutral or encourage new firms and 
SMEs.” Our second variable, government support, is a GEM score that measures government 
support programs fostering entrepreneurship. It is defined as “The extent to which public 
policies support entrepreneurship.” Given these two variables are correlated, we enter them 
individually to avoid collinearity issues. 
3.5 Sample Split Variable 
The probability of obtaining bank credit might depend on the setting entrepreneurial 
firms and banks are embedded in (Welter 2011; Moro et al. 2018). Bank lending in all 
member countries of the European Union (EU) is regulated by the Basel agreements, with 
Basel III (Bank for International Settlements, 2010) being the latest update on how banks 
must measure the risk they incur. Accordingly, the Basel agreements indirectly regulate the 
way in which banks assess their customers and the probability that they will lend to them. 
However, public spending is regulated differently in EU countries depending whether 
they are members of the Eurozone. The countries in the Eurozone have ratified the Maastricht 
Treaty (based on the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) that regulates public spending and 
thus restricts governments’ options to expand it. 
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Consequently, we expect to find differences in the role that tax advantages and 
government support can play in helping entrepreneurial firms to access credit in Eurozone 
and non-Eurozone countries. 
3.5 Control Variables 
Previous research has identified aspects that impede firms’ access to bank finance, 
including the characteristics of the firm (Gropp et al., 2012; Kysucky and Norden, 2014); the 
type and characteristics of the relationship between bank and firm (Angelini et al., 1998; 
Berger and Udell, 2006; Brown et al., 2013; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff and Körting, 
1998; Moro and Fink, 2013); and the characteristics of the organization (Coal et al., 2015; 
Goldberg and White, 1998; Rauch and Hendrickson, 2002; Uchida et al., 2008). While 
traditionally these measures were researched in isolation, we follow the call by Lee et al. 
(2011) to offer a more holistic account of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, and accordingly 
include them as control variables. 
Firms are clustered according to four age categories derived from SAFE. We use 
firms up to 2 years old; firms between 2 and 5 years old, and firms between 5 and 9 years old 
as dummy variables to identify the age group. Older firms are more likely to be successful 
when applying for a loan (Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994) since they have 
an established reputation that banks rely on when making lending decisions (Martinelli, 
1997): For the same reason they are also less likely to be discouraged borrowers. We also 
control for a firm dimension in discriminating between micro, small, medium-sized, and large 
firms. Our expectation, in line with past research, is that younger firms should face greater 
difficulties in accessing credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1995, 1994). We control for the change in 
labor costs and in turnover. These are categorical variables that take the value -1, if the firm 
faces a reduction, 0 if there is no change, and +1 if there is an increase. Regarding the 
financial strategy implemented by firms, we include dummies that identify different sources 
19 
 
of finance used: trade credit, leasing and factoring, retained earnings, additional equity, 
bank loans, and other loans. We also include a set of a variables (finance instruments) that 
measure the financial sophistication of the firm by considering the number of alternative 
sources of finance it has used. Our argument is that firms that rely on a greater number of 
alternative sources of finance present a lower risk than those that rely on fewer: they have 
both a financial base that is diversified (reducing the risk that their financial resources will be 
exhausted) and their finances should be less opaque because they must produce information 
to satisfy the providers of funds. We also include a variable that measures the challenges a 
firm faces in different contexts; for example, finding customers, competition, access to 
finance, production costs, lack of skilled workers, regulation, and other issues. For each area 
the firms are asked to evaluate the challenges on a 10-point Likert-type scale. We generate 
the variable by adding together the scores that each firm allocated to each area. In addition, 
we include a variable that measures the economic risk perceived by firms (firm outlook). 
Finally, we consider the creditworthiness of the firm. Since our analysis focuses on firms that 
share one or more of the following characteristics of innovative firms, and we also include 
these indicators as control variables: 1) a variable that identifies process innovativeness and 
2) a variable that identifies any other type of innovativeness. We also cluster the firms with a 
high growth rate and those that number business angels or venture capitalists among their 
shareholders. Finally, we identify the firms that already have a bank loan.1 
Demand for credit can affect the probability of obtaining it: Firms operating in 
countries where there is a relatively low demand for credit might find it easier to access 
because there is less competition. In such countries, there should therefore be a higher 
probability that firms are granted credit and a lower probability that a firm will be a 
                                                 
1 For a detailed description of the variables included in SAFE see European Central Bank, 2017, “European 




discouraged borrower. We operationalize the demand for credit as the ratio between the 
number of firms that apply for a loan to the overall number of firms in each country in each 
year. 
Moreover, we consider a set of country-specific and time-varying macroeconomic 
variables to capture the macroeconomic context in which the firms operate. We include the 
change in the GDP and, to account for the financial context, also an index measuring 
perceived economic outlook in general terms (economic outlook). 
The dataset provides unmatched observations for five years (2013–2017) and 
therefore we also include four dummies that identify the year in which the data were 
collected. 
As discussed in the methodology section, we simultaneously estimate the application 
for credit (Equation 7) and the probability of obtaining credit (Equation 8) as well as the 
probability of being a discouraged borrower (Equation 10) and the probability of not applying 
for a loan (Equation 9). While only firms in need of finance may decide to apply for a loan, at 
the same time, the probability of a firm obtaining credit is independent of the fact that it 
needs additional finance. Similarly, a firm that does not apply for a loan might have been 
influenced either by not requiring finance or because it is a discouraged borrower. 
Accordingly, our simultaneous regression model differentiates the regression that estimates 
the probability of applying for a loan/not applying for a loan by including two variables; 
namely, the fact that the firm states that it needs additional long-term loans and the fact that 
the firm states that it needs additional short-term loans. 
Finally, as discussed in the methodology section, our model may suffer from 
endogeneity, and it therefore needs instruments that can perturbate our variables of interest 
but not affect our dependent variables. We identify two variables: the debt to GDP ratio and 
the inflation rate. As mentioned above, our argument is that countries with high debt to GDP 
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ratios will find it difficult to justify granting tax advantages and will have limited resources to 
support entrepreneurship financially (e.g., in the form of grants or discounted loans). We also 
include the inflation rate because inflation is typically a sign that an economy is overheating 
and when countries face higher inflation, they tend to cut stimuli to the economy (in the form 
of reductions to public spending) that can also mean reducing government initiatives for 
entrepreneurship (tax advantages and government support). Grilli and Murtinu (2018) explain 
that standard direct tests to assess the validity of instruments are not feasible when the 
dependent variables are binary, and we therefore followed their alternative approach and 
estimated Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) regressions (Basu et al., 2017). The test 
consists of three steps. First, we ran a first-stage OLS model where the dependent variable 
was one of the two endogenous variables, either debt to GDP ratio or inflation rate. Second, 
we calculated the residuals of those regressions. Third, we estimate a probit model for 
equations (8) and (10), where we include, as additional regressors, the first-step residuals and 
each instrument separately. To account for selectivity, this second-stage probit is run only on 
the subsample of firms that applied for credit and the subsample of firms that did not. For the 
instruments to be considered valid exclusion restrictions, their coefficients should not be 
statistically significant in the second-step regression. 
 
4. Descriptive statistics 
 The dataset used contains 18,872 observations from 28 EU countries for the period 
between 2013 and 2017. A summary of the descriptive statistics is reported in Table 1. 
-------- 
TABLE 1 HERE 
--------- 
The majority of the firms are SMEs (90%) and more than 80% are more than nine years 
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old. In terms of financing, firms use leasing, bank loans, and trade credit quite intensively, but 
do not seem to be greatly reliant on equity. More than two thirds of the firms are engaged in 
some form of innovation according to the criteria outlined in Section 3.5 above. Only 22% 
enjoy the support of a business angel or venture capitalist. Around 73.17% of the firms that 
apply for a loan obtained it, while 9.01% of those that did not apply are discouraged borrowers. 
The fact that the firms in the sample are largely well established, reflects the stratification of 
the original population. Cyprus has the largest proportion of old firms (91%) followed by Spain 
(83%) and Finland (81%). The Netherlands has the largest proportion of young firms (2.4%) 
followed by France (2.2%) and Spain (2.1%). The industry with the largest proportion of old 
firms is manufacturing (34%) followed by the service sector (31%). The largest number of 
young firms is found in the service sector (42%) and the next largest proportion is in 
manufacturing (26%). 
 As far as the variables of interest are concerned, the averages of the two GEM indexes 
used are quite similar (2.37 for government programs and 2.54 for tax advantage). At the 
same time there are variations around Europe. Figure 1A (tax advantage) and Figure 1B 
(government support) report the average GEM values for each country in our sample. 
-------- 
FIGURE 1A HERE 
--------- 
-------- 




We simultaneously estimate the probability that a firm applies for a loan/does not 
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apply for a loan and the probability that a firm obtains a loan (test of H1a and H2a) or is a 
discouraged borrower (test of H1b and H2b). In addition, we estimate our model while 
monitoring for any potential endogeneity of our variables of interest. Accordingly, we present 
two pairs of models: the first pair focuses on the probability of obtaining credit (H1a and 
H2a): Model 1 addresses tax advantages, whereas Model 2 addresses government support. 
Each model includes two simultaneously estimated regressions: the probability of applying 
for a loan and the probability of obtaining a loan conditional on having applied for a loan. 
Then, we re-estimate the same models but focus on the probability of being a discouraged 
borrower conditional on not having applied for a loan (H1b and H2b): Model 3 explores the 
role of tax advantages and Model 4 the role of government support. 
5.1 Government Initiatives and Obtain Credit 
The results regarding the impact of government initiatives on the probability that 
entrepreneurial firms obtain credit are reported in Table 2. 
-------- 
TABLE 2 HERE 
--------- 
In Model 1, regression 1 reports the results of the probability of obtaining credit and 
explores the effect of tax advantages fostering entrepreneurship. An examination of the 
covariates establishes that the firm dimension has the expected results (smaller firms are less 
likely to apply for a loan), while age has no effect. Among the sources of finance, relying on 
profit or on past loans is significant and increases the probability of applying for a loan, while 
the use of leasing/factoring reduces it. At the same time, the fact that the firm is backed by 
business angels (BA) or venture capital (VC) or by one or more banks reduces the probability 
of it applying for a loan. It is possible that such firms can already count on access to funds, 
thus reducing their need for further finance. Labor cost, turnover, creditworthiness, level of 
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financial sophistication, and the intensity of the challenges facing the firm do not affect the 
probability of that firm applying for a loan. A firm’s perceived economic outlook and a 
greater demand for credit is positively and significantly related to the probability of it 
applying for a loan. The level of process innovativeness has a marginal positive effect on the 
probability of applying for a loan. As far as the variable of interest is concerned, a more 
favorable taxation regime does not affect the probability of applying for a loan. 
We test Hypothesis 1a in regression 2 that explores the impact of tax advantages on 
the probability of entrepreneurial firms obtaining a loan. Tax advantages exert a positive and 
significant effect on the probability of entrepreneurial firms obtaining a bank loan. This 
finding supports H1a. As far as the covariates are concerned, this specification supports the 
point that smaller firms are less likely to obtain credit. In this case too, retained profit and 
previous bank loans are significant and increase the probability of obtaining credit, while the 
use of trade credit reduces the probability of obtaining a loan. A positive general economic 
outlook and a firm’s creditworthiness increase the probability of it obtaining a loan, while the 
innovativeness of the firm in terms of product/business organization has a negative impact on 
its obtaining credit. The financial sophistication of the firm reduces the probability of it 
obtaining credit. A greater demand for credit reduces the probability of obtaining a loan 
because, as discussed in the data section, such demand increases the competition among firms 
seeking a loan. 
Model 2 analyzes the effects of government programs fostering entrepreneurship on 
the probability that an entrepreneurial firm applies for a loan (regression 3) and the 
probability of obtaining the loan (regression 4). The results of regression 3 are similar to 
those of regression 1 exploring the probability of applying for credit in the case of tax 
advantages except for the covariate that captures the role of the economic growth in a 
country, which in this case proves to be marginally negative and significant. As far as the 
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variable of interest is concerned, government programs fostering entrepreneurship do not 
affect the probability of entrepreneurial firms applying for a bank loan. 
We tested Hypothesis 2a in regression 4 that assesses the impact of government 
programs fostering entrepreneurship on the probability of an entrepreneurial firm obtaining a 
loan (conditional on the firm having applied for a loan). We find government programs 
fostering entrepreneurship exert a positive and significant effect on the probability of 
obtaining a bank loan. Accordingly, H2a is supported. As far as the covariates are concerned, 
this specification presents results that are in line with those obtained in regression 2. 
We report the results of the test of the validity of instruments in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. This table reports the coefficients of the two 2SRI regressions: tax advantages and 
government programs fostering entrepreneurship. Our instruments are not statistically 
significant in either of the regressions, thus providing reassurance that they constitute valid 
exclusion restrictions that have no explanatory power over the main dependent variable. 
5.2 Government Initiatives and Discouraged Borrowers 
The findings regarding the impact of government initiatives fostering 
entrepreneurship on the probability that firms are discouraged from applying for bank credit 
are reported in Table 3. 
-------- 
TABLE 3 HERE 
-------- 
 Model 3, regression 5 explores the probability of a firm not applying for a loan. In 
this regression, firm size shows the expected effect, with smaller-sized firms being more 
likely to be discouraged from applying for a loan, while firm age does not have an effect. 
Retaining earnings, a positive economic outlook, access to bank loans, firm creditworthiness 
and the support provided by the bank system reduce the probability that a firm will not apply 
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for a loan. Similarly, firms that pursue a more innovative agenda in terms of process 
developments are less likely to avoid applying for a loan. At the same time, a greater use of 
leasing and factoring increases the probability that a firm will not apply for a loan because 
those are alternative sources of finance to loans. In addition, a greater demand for credit 
reduces the probability that a firm will not apply for a loan. Finally, additional firm 
requirements in terms of both short- and long-term finance, reduce the probability that a firm 
will not apply for a loan. As far as the variable of interest is concerned, tax advantages do not 
affect the probability that an entrepreneurial firm will not apply for a bank loan. 
We tested Hypothesis 1b in regression 6 exploring the impact of tax advantages on 
the probability that a firm will not become a discouraged borrower given that it does not 
apply for a loan. We find that tax advantages do not affect the probability of an 
entrepreneurial firm becoming a discouraged borrower. Accordingly, H1b is not supported. 
As far as the covariates are concerned, there are some changes with respect to regression 5: 
age proves to have a very marginal effect (the class of 2–5 year-old firms is marginally 
significant and positively related to being a discouraged borrower); leasing/factoring proves 
not to be significant while the access to other loans and the cost of labor prove significant; 
they decrease the probability that a firm will become a discouraged borrower; general 
economic outlook and a firm’s creditworthiness reduce the probability of a firm becoming a 
discouraged borrower; a firm’s process innovativeness proves not to be significant; while the 
intensity of the operational challenges faced by firms increases the probability that they will 
become discouraged borrowers. 
Model 4, regression 7 explores the effect of government programs fostering 
entrepreneurship on the probability of an entrepreneurial firm not applying for a bank loan. 
This regression is qualitatively identical to the corresponding regression 5 in Model 3. 
Government programs fostering entrepreneurship do not affect the probability that an 
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entrepreneurial firm will not apply for a loan. 
We test Hypothesis 2b in regression 8, which explores the impact of government 
programs fostering entrepreneurship on the probability that a firm not applying for a loan is 
driven by the firm being a discouraged borrower. We find that government programs 
fostering entrepreneurship do not reduce the probability of an entrepreneurial firm becoming 
a discouraged borrower. Accordingly, H2b is not supported. 
An inspection of Table A1 confirms that the choice of instruments appears to be valid 
for both the regressions addressing tax advantages and that addressing government programs 
fostering entrepreneurship. Moreover, even in the analysis of discouraged borrowers, where, 
our measures of government intervention do not seem to play a strong role, the evidence 
offers reassurance that the instruments have no explanatory power over the main dependent 
variable. 
5.3 Eurozone and non-Eurozone Area 
 As discussed above Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries face different budget 
constraints that can affect their governments capability to foster entrepreneurship, with the 
constraints for Eurozone countries potentially more restrictive. In addition, while the level of 
government initiatives for entrepreneurship (tax advantage 2.37 in the Eurozone versus 2.26 
in non-Eurozone territories; and government support programs 2.86 in the Eurozone versus 
2.51 in non-Eurozone territories) does not differ significantly between Eurozone and non-
Eurozone member countries, the level of demand for credit (0.38 in the Eurozone versus 0.28 
in the non-Eurozone territories) is significantly higher (i.e., by.05%) in the Eurozone than in 
the non-Eurozone territory. The stronger demand for credit suggests that banks apply greater 
scrutiny when selecting among loan applicants, so that the access to tax advantages and 
government support can play an important role. This suggests that firms in Eurozone might 
derive so little support from their governments that it may not be relevant to them in terms of 
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advancing the business; however, the greater scrutiny that firms face in Eurozone countries 
(because of the greater demand for credit) may enhance the impact of any government 
initiatives fostering entrepreneurship (tax advantages and government support programs) 
compared to those in non-Eurozone countries, with the result that those initiatives play an 
important role in accessing credit. In order to explore these two forces, we re-estimate our 
models on split samples (Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries). The respective regressions 
are not reported for reasons of space but are available on request. 
The regressions on the subsample of firms operating in Eurozone countries show no 
major changes with respect to the control variables and both variables of interest (tax 
advantages and government support) are significant and, moreover, positively affect the 
probability of entrepreneurial firms obtaining a loan. In the subsample including firms 
operating in non-Eurozone countries, only the variable tax advantage proves to be 
significant—and then only very marginally—but it is negatively related to the probability of 
obtaining credit. The results suggest a major impact of demand for credit: greater demand 
implies that banks scrutinize the risk incurred more rigorously when making the decision on 
whether to lend. In such a context, any information that reduces the risk is factored. Tax 
advantage and government support, as risk reducing factors, are therefore exploited by banks 
and consequently contribute to increasing the probability that firms will have access to credit. 
 We replicate the same analysis in the case of discouraged borrowers because we 
cannot rule out that those variables that are insignificant when estimated on the overall 
sample, become significant when we look at the subsamples. We find that in neither the 
subsample comprising Eurozone countries, nor in that covering non-Eurozone countries do 
government initiatives exert any effect on the probability of becoming a discouraged 
borrower conditional on the fact that the firm does not apply for a loan. 
5.4 Marginal Effects Analysis 
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Kennedy (2002) warns that it is important not to confuse significance with substance 
and therefore it is essential to explore the economic impact of governmental initiatives 
fostering entrepreneurship. Accordingly, we explore the marginal effects of a change in our 
measures tax advantages / government support programs on the probability of entrepreneurial 
firms obtaining credit. We focus our analysis on obtaining credit because it is the only 
dependent variable where we found government initiatives fostering entrepreneurship had a 
significant impact. To obtain a nuanced picture, we explore the impact of such a change by 
differentiating countries according to the quartile they belong to. Owing to examining the 
situation for entrepreneurial firms, we explore the impact for 1) different firm size, 2) firm 
age, 3) growth rate, and 4) innovativeness. With entrepreneurial firms being defined as 
young, small, innovative, and fast-growing, these firms are the target group for governmental 
initiatives fostering entrepreneurship and, accordingly, should benefit most from tax 
advantages and government support. 
The impact of a change in the tax advantage policy on the firm’s probability of 
obtaining credit according to its dimension is reported in Figure 1A. 
-------- 
FIGURES 1A AND 1B HERE 
--------- 
Figure 1 shows that the impact of tax advantages on smaller firms is larger than it is 
on bigger firms: for micro firms, a change in the tax advantage generates an increase of 
10.4% in the probability of obtaining credit in countries in the bottom quartile while the 
corresponding increase in the case of firms operating in countries in the top quartile is 15.1%. 
The results on changes in government support programs on the probability of obtaining credit 
are shown in Figure 1B. Again, smaller firms benefit more than larger ones from government 
support policies. Specifically, for micro firms the increase in the probability of obtaining 
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credit is between 12.6% and 18.5%. However, large firms can also benefit from government 
support because in their case, the increase in the probability of obtaining credit is between 
11.4% and 13.4%. 
The examination of the impact of changes in tax advantages and government support 
for firms according to their age class is reported in Figures 2A and 2B. 
-------- 
FIGURES 2A AND 2B HERE 
--------- 
Figure 2A shows the impact of a change in tax advantage on the probability of 
obtaining credit. The trends clearly show a flat curve for all the firms that are younger than 
10 years old, and those same firms also benefit most from a more favorable taxation system: 
A positive change in the tax advantage increases the probability of obtaining credit among 
younger firms by between 15.5% (firms of between two and five years old in top quartile 
countries) and 11.6% (firms of between five and 10 years old in bottom quartile countries). In 
the case of established firms (those more than 10 years old) this probability increases by 
between 9.6% and 12.6%. Figure 2B reports the corresponding marginal effect analysis in 
terms of government support programs. In this case the firms that benefit most from a change 
in government support programs are those that belong to the mid-aged class of firms between 
two and 10 years of age that show an increase in the probability of obtaining credit of 
between 18.0% and 13.8%. Older firms enjoy an increase in the probability of obtaining 
credit of between 12.2% and 14.9% while the corresponding results for the very young firms 
are between 14.3% and 16.5%. 





FIGURE 3A AND 3B HERE 
--------- 
The trends suggest that the firms that benefit most from a more favorable taxation 
system are those that grow at a faster rate: a change in the tax advantage increases the 
probability of obtaining credit for faster-growing firms from between 11.6% and 13.5%. 
Figure 3B reports the corresponding marginal effect analysis in terms of government support 
programs. Furthermore, in this case, the firms that benefit most from an increase in the 
government support programs are those that grow faster (increase between 8.9% and 11.6%). 
Finally, we present the results with a focus on more innovative versus less innovative 
firms (Figures 4A and 4B). 
-------- 
FIGURES 4A AND 4B HERE 
--------- 
Firms that innovate more benefit most from government initiatives fostering 
entrepreneurship. In the case of changes to the tax advantage bestowed, the probability of 
innovative firms obtaining credit rises by between 9.8% and 12.2%, while firms that do not 
innovate extract an increase of only between 7.6% and 8.4%. Figure 4B explores the effect of 
change in the level of government support. In this case the impact is even greater: Firms that 
pursue both product and process innovation enjoy an increase in the probability of accessing 
credit of between 13.4% and 14.1%, compared to between 9.6% and 10.6% for firms that do 
not innovate. 
A common pattern in the results presented above is that changes in government 
support affect the probability of obtaining credit in both more supportive and less supportive 
countries and for any type of firm, while the more entrepreneurial ones benefit most. In 
addition, a pattern emerges from the comparison between the two types of government 
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initiatives: Government support programs have a greater impact than tax advantages. 
 
6. Discussion 
 Our results suggest that government initiatives in terms of tax advantages and 
government support programs have a positive spillover effect on the probability that a firm 
obtains credit from a bank; while there is no spillover effect on the probability either of a firm 
applying for a loan or becoming a discouraged borrower. We also find evidence that 
government initiatives play a more important role in countries where the demand for credit is 
greater (in the Eurozone) than in countries where there is less demand for credit (the non-
Eurozone territories). These results provide important insights. 
In their attempts to promote entrepreneurship, the major challenge for governments is 
to provide the proper type and scale of support for entrepreneurial firms in order to 
effectively address market failure (Rotger et al., 2012). If governments provide too little 
support, they will not be able to stimulate entrepreneurship sufficiently to reach a socially 
optimal level, which might weaken the economy as a whole. However, if governments 
provide too much support, they risk encouraging low-quality firms (e.g., those with weak 
business models or weak venture teams), and such firms tend to fail not long after they have 
received support. Resources invested in such unsustainable ventures are misallocated and 
wealth is destroyed. On an aggregate level, government initiatives fostering entrepreneurship 
applied on too large a scale can contribute to a temporary overheating of the economy. 
Finally, badly designed government intervention can crowd out finance from banks and 
private investors such as BA and venture capitalists compromising the efficiency of the 
financial market (Cumming et al., 2018). In addition, when accounting for the particularities 
of context in this study, it becomes obvious that the free circulation of capital, labor, and 
goods within the European Common Market poses an additional challenge to policy makers. 
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Excess support for entrepreneurship in one EU member state can prompt firms to relocate 
their operations to that supportive EU member state, which might trigger a spiral of 
competition among EU member countries that pushes the scale of government initiatives 
fostering entrepreneurship over the optimal level. However, to ensure optimal allocation of 
resources, it is essential that governments find the right balance in their initiatives fostering 
entrepreneurship (Acs et al., 2018; Acs and Szerb, 2007). 
To this end, our results are quite reassuring. The evidence we elicit suggests that 
governments within the EU seem to implement initiatives fostering entrepreneurship on the 
right scale to generate positive spillover effects. The fact that government initiatives fostering 
entrepreneurship boost the probability of entrepreneurial firms obtaining a positive lending 
decision from banks signals that such initiatives are effectively addressing the market failure 
economies face regarding entrepreneurial activity (Bertoni et al., 2019; Cumming et al., 
2018). Our findings also show that government initiatives do not affect the probability of 
entrepreneurial firms applying for loans, or that of firms becoming discouraged borrowers. 
While at first sight this finding might seem to question the effectiveness of government 
initiatives fostering entrepreneurship, in fact it highlights that these initiatives are provided on 
an appropriate scale. This is because overly supportive government initiatives would 
encourage low-quality firms to apply for a loan and if they did so, the probability that they 
would become discouraged borrowers would reduce, which would expose lenders to 
potentially damaging risk. At the same time, excessive governmental support would lead to 
the state taking on too much risk related to unsustainable ventures, making it attractive for 
entrepreneurs to pursue even low-quality venture projects. In other words, when governments 
support access to too much credit, they can instill the idea that credit is easier to access thus 
encouraging weak firms to apply for a loan confident they will succeed in obtaining it. In our 
results, we do not see evidence pointing in the direction of an oversupply of government 
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initiatives fostering entrepreneurship; government initiatives instead seem to have a positive 
spillover effect (Cumming et al., 2018). 
In the previous section we conclude that both tax advantages and government support 
have an impact on banks’ lending behavior but they do not affect entrepreneurs’ borrowing 
behavior. Accordingly, government initiatives in the EU member states seem to effectively 
facilitate access to credit for entrepreneurial firms without warping management borrowing 
decisions. However, alongside monitoring the scale of its initiatives fostering 
entrepreneurship, government must choose the right type of measures. This aspect can be 
addressed by examining the economic impact of the different types of government initiatives 
fostering entrepreneurship illustrated in this study. Our evidence suggests government 
support programs have a greater impact than tax advantages. There are several possible 
reasons for that finding: First, the measures labeled government support programs (e.g., 
grants, guarantees, and funds) tend to be more selectively granted to entrepreneurial firms 
than tax advantages; whereas tax advantages are typically offered to all entrepreneurial firms, 
government support programs target firms with specific characteristics in terms of factors 
such as industry, firm size, location, and market served (Cumming and Li, 2013; Cumming et 
al., 2018). Second, often access to government support programs is subject to the evaluation 
of a project plan detailing the anticipated effects of the support measure on policy goals such 
as job creation, growth, and innovation. The competitive approach used to allocate 
government support implies that only those firms that are pursuing convincing strategies in 
line with the government’s policy goals tend to be successful in the application process. 
Accordingly, being able to access government support programs signals to the bank that the 
entrepreneurial venture (e.g., business model and venture team) has merit (Bertoni et al., 
2019; Guerini and Quas, 2016) and the consequent spillover effect is that such information 
helps the bank to take an informed lending decision. Tax advantages are open to all 
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entrepreneurial firms and just inject extra cash into firms’ bank accounts while providing no 
such information on the merit of the entrepreneurial venture. Third, the specificity of the 
government support programs implies that they are designed to address particular weaknesses 
of entrepreneurial firms and the associated risks. For instance, a firm that lacks assets to 
obtain a collateralized loan may benefit from government guarantees. Such government 
support programs not only provide support to firms, but at the same time have positive 
spillover effects on banks’ lending decisions because they allow banks to hedge and reduce 
the specific risk incurred by a lender to an entrepreneurial firm. A very general initiative such 
as a tax advantage is not able to address such very specific risks incurred by banks when 
lending to entrepreneurial firms. In general, government support programs seem to be more 
effective in fostering entrepreneurial firms’ access to bank finance, because that type of 
initiative is more selective and better targeted (Bertoni et al., 2019; Cumming et al., 2018). 
The last aspect we must explore is whether government initiatives to foster 
entrepreneurship target the right firms, that is, those that are entrepreneurial (i.e., young, 
small, innovative, and high-growth) and, hence, address the systematic disadvantages caused 
by market failure. Our results show that any change in either tax advantages or government 
support programs play a greater role for younger than for older firms and for those that are 
smaller rather than larger. In addition, we find that those firms with higher growth rates and 
those pursuing innovation the most intensively enjoy the greatest boost to their efforts to 
obtain credit induced by government initiatives fostering entrepreneurship. This finding adds 
support to the assertion that in the EU, government initiatives fostering support for 
entrepreneurship are appropriately designed to have a positive spillover effect on the lending 





 The current research analyzes the impact of government initiatives fostering 
entrepreneurship on firms’ access to bank credit across the member countries of the EU. We 
found that government initiatives do not affect the demand for credit but do positively affect 
firms’ ability to obtain credit. The evidence also suggests that government initiatives do not 
influence a firm’s decision to apply for a loan and pursue projects. Hence, such initiatives do 
not modify the demand for credit by affecting the expected performance of the projects in 
question. However, they influence the banks’ perception of the risk incurred when lending to 
firms; hence, banks are more likely to lend to entrepreneurial firms because they perceive that 
doing so entails less risk. We also discovered differences between countries where there is a 
high demand for credit (those in the Eurozone) and those where the demand for credit is low 
(non-Eurozone countries). In the former context, bank processes for selecting borrowers are 
more prudent: Any additional factor that signals the strength of the applicant and thus reduces 
the risk the bank incurs is taken into consideration and positively affects the probability of 
obtaining credit. 
 Our results are very intriguing in that they stress the importance of policies that have 
positive spillover effects in that they reduce the risk lenders incur when lending to 
entrepreneurial firms. More importantly, our evidence suggests that government initiatives 
fostering entrepreneurship do not affect the decision of entrepreneurs on whether to borrow. 
If anything, they tend to affect the probability of obtaining credit among the more 
entrepreneurial firms. Overall, our evidence suggests that the European governments as a 
group implement effective policies to support entrepreneurship. Avoiding negative spillover 
effects and distortion is very important, because in a functioning economy the decision 
whether to pursue an entrepreneurial venture has to be taken based on the intrinsic capability 




 However, our results cannot easily be generalized and should be interpreted with the 
limitations of this study in mind. First, because the available data report whether the 
applicants have previously been denied finance from alternative sources, we cannot account 
for possible inferences of such rejections on the relationships studied in this research. 
Previous research indicates that bank finance is not necessarily the first choice for firms 
(Cosh et al., 2009). The aforementioned limitation offers an attractive opportunity for future 
research. In addition, readers should bear in mind that we explore a specific context, the EU. 
However, our results are interesting and relevant for all countries that want to implement 
government support programs fostering entrepreneurship because they offer guidance on 
which aspects must be accounted for when such initiatives are chosen, and their scale is 
decided upon. In addition, we focus on two types of governmental initiatives (tax advantages 
and governmental support programs). Accordingly, we cannot rule out that different results 
would be obtained if other types of government initiatives fostering entrepreneurship were 
considered. 
 The limitations of our work suggest further areas of investigation. First, it would be 
interesting to expand the analysis to other countries. Two particular streams of research seem 
particularly attractive. The analysis could be replicated in other developed countries, 
particularly if they have a different tradition in terms of entrepreneurial development, 
government initiatives, and bank lending techniques; an example might be the USA. The 
analysis could also focus on developing countries, particularly fast-growing ones with a focus 
on entrepreneurship. Second, it would be interesting to conduct a fine-grained analysis of 
government initiatives. As discussed, we use rather general metrics developed by GEM that 
sum up various specific measures in an index. Governments can, however, adopt many 
different measures under each type of initiative, some of which might be more effective than 
others because different measures leverage different aspects of entrepreneurial firms and the 
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ways they access bank finance. Accordingly, a more detailed analysis might provide a deeper 
insight into government initiatives and their impact on firms’ bank lending. Such an analysis 
would have to be based on either collecting detailed data in a comprehensive sample of 
countries or sorting out the biases in the data governments provide on the scale and type of 
their initiatives fostering entrepreneurship as called for in the pioneering study of Lundström 
et al. (2014). 
Notwithstanding the above limitations, our study indicates that government initiatives 
play a more successful role in fostering entrepreneurial firms’ access to bank finance without 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean   Std. Dev  Min Max 
Loan application .2293  .4204  0 1 
Loan obtained (subject to application) .7317  .4639  0 1 
Discouraged borrower (subject not applying) .0901  .4544 0 1 
GEM - Tax advantage  2.3404  .5584  1.3500 3.7700 
GEM - Government support 2.5789  .4751  1.6600 3.9600 
Micro firm .2938  .4555  0 1 
Small firm .2993  .4579  0 1 
Medium firm .2952  .4561  0 1 
Age up to 2 yrs. .0141  .1178  0 1 
Age 2 to 5 yrs. .0548  .2276  0 1 
Age 5 to 10 yrs. .1338  .3404  0 1 
Equity .0428  .2024  0 1 
Retained profits .2346  .4237  0 1 
Trade credit .2817  .4498  0 1 
Leasing and factoring .3905  .4878  0 1 
Bank loans .3588  .4796  0 1 
Other loans .1319  .3384  0 1 
Labor cost change .4957  .6232  -1 1 
Turnover change .2864  .7945  -1 1 
Firms involved in new process development .4233  .4940  0 1 
Firms involved in other innovation .6524  .4761  0 1 
Firms with high growth rate .2272  .4190  0 1 
Firms with BA_VC investors .2460  .4307  0 1 
Firms with bank support .1504  .6951  -1 1 
Pressing problems  31.3072   8.5126  0 50 
Financial sophistication  4.2849   2.5052  1 20 
Firm perception of economic outlook  .2224  .7367  -1 1 
Firm creditworthiness .2370  .6094  -1 1 
General economic outlook  -.0169  .7326  -1 1 
Change in GDP .02067  .0259  -.0596 .2557 
Demand of credit .3535  .0830  .1517 .6083 
The firm needs additional short-term finance .2108  .6198  -1 1 
The firm needs additional long-term finance .2389  .6372  -1 1 
Debt: GDP 83.5787  35.3225  .0900 1.8080 





Figure 1A: Average values of the GEM score for Tax Advantage 
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Table 2: Obtain Credit 
Dependent Variables: Apply for Credit and Obtain Credit; Variables of interest: Index for tax support to entrepreneurial firms; Index for the 
government support policies; 
Control Variables: firm dimension (dummies for micro, small and medium firms); age of the firm (dummy for younger than 2 years, 2–5 years, 
5–9 years); Source of funding used (dummy for use of equity, retained earnings, trade credit, leasing/factoring, bank, other); change in labor 
costs (increase, stable, decrease); change in turnover (increase, stable, decrease); firm innovativeness in process; firm other innovativeness (use 
any type of innovation); firm’s growth rate (dummy for high growth rate firms); Business Angels or Venture Capital involvement (dummy if BA 
or VC are shareholders of the firm); bank support (dummy about whether the bank is supportive); Firm sophistication (number of alternative 
sources of finance used), pressing problems (amount of general challenges that the firm is facing); Firm’s perceived economic outlook; Firm 
creditworthiness; Bank perceived economic outlook; Economic outlook (change in the GDP); Demand for credit (as a ratio of the firms 
demanding credit among all firms); Firm’s short-term credit needs; firm’s long-term credit needs. 


















GEM - Tax advantages for entrepreneurship 0.118 0.611**   
 (0.166) (0.250)   
GEM - Government support for entrepreneurship   0.111 0.622** 
      (0.150) (0.266) 
Dummy micro firm -0.254*** -0.318*** -0.252*** -0.322*** 
 (0.0655) (0.120) (0.0647) (0.121) 
Dummy small firm -0.135*** -0.216* -0.136*** -0.221* 
 (0.0432) (0.122) (0.0428) (0.124) 
Dummy medium firm -0.0263 -0.0709 -0.0268 -0.0716 
  (0.0520) (0.0746) (0.0520) (0.0744) 
Dummy age up to 2 yrs. -0.0821 0.0705 -0.0823 0.123 
 (0.155) (0.199) (0.155) (0.208) 
Dummy age 2 to 5 yrs. 0.0381 -0.254** 0.0390 -0.256** 
 (0.0343) (0.113) (0.0347) (0.115) 
Dummy age 5 to 10 yrs. -0.0187 -0.172* -0.0144 -0.170 
  (0.0353) (0.103) (0.0353) (0.103) 
Equity -0.0374 0.0792 -0.0351 0.0972 
 (0.0871) (0.117) (0.0862) (0.123) 
Retained profits 0.111*** 0.165** 0.111*** 0.169** 
 (0.0292) (0.0805) (0.0293) (0.0785) 
Trade credit 0.0363 -0.107** 0.0492 -0.0999** 
 (0.0524) (0.0487) (0.0469) (0.0428) 
Leasing and factoring -0.152*** -0.0578 -0.157*** -0.0555 
 (0.0585) (0.0657) (0.0605) (0.0629) 
Bank loans 1.603*** 1.463*** 1.605*** 1.454*** 
 (0.0500) (0.114) (0.0501) (0.111) 
Other loans 0.0896 -0.102* 0.0835 -0.109** 
  (0.0644) (0.0563) (0.0667) (0.0520) 
Labor cost change 0.00344 0.108*** 0.00299 0.111*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0380) (0.0189) (0.0396) 
Turnover change -0.00166 0.0407 -0.00343 0.0443 
  (0.0241) (0.0557) (0.0240) (0.0565) 
Firms involved in new process development 0.0452** -0.0469 0.0479** -0.0487 
 (0.0209) (0.0554) (0.0218) (0.0542) 
Firms involved in other innovation 0.0833 -0.171*** 0.0795 -0.175*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0561) (0.0573) (0.0565) 
Firms with high growth rate 0.0899*** -0.250** 0.0968*** -0.247** 
  (0.0254) (0.122) (0.0258) (0.120) 
Firms with BA_VC investors -0.104*** -0.0461 -0.104*** -0.0351 
 (0.0301) (0.0974) (0.0297) (0.0963) 
Firms with Bank support -0.0715*** 0.573*** -0.0717*** 0.567*** 
  (0.0257) (0.0412) (0.0246) (0.0426) 
Financial Sophistication 0.000127 -0.0688*** -0.000731 -0.0689*** 
 (0.00762) (0.0229) (0.00753) (0.0256) 
Pressing problems -0.00284 0.0109*** -0.00326 0.00980*** 
 (0.00236) (0.00358) (0.00206) (0.00349) 
Firm perception of economic outlook  0.0623** -0.111** 0.0639** -0.115** 
 (0.0309) (0.0513) (0.0314) (0.0512) 
Firm creditworthiness 0.0277 0.0828*** 0.0241 0.0787*** 
  (0.0438) (0.0251) (0.0444) (0.0253) 
General economic outlook 0.0163 0.0871*** 0.0144 0.0848*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0211) (0.0184) (0.0217) 
Change in GDP -0.0164 -0.0411*** -0.0164* -0.0414*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0157) (0.00884) (0.0124) 
Demand for credit 3.339*** -0.750* 3.273*** -0.789* 
  (0.370) (0.428) (0.309) (0.473) 
The firm needs additional short-term finance 0.121***  0.123***  
 (0.0418)  (0.0432)  
The firm needs additional long-term finance 0.530***  0.531***  
  (0.0298)   (0.0298)   
Constant -2.599*** -0.696 -2.595*** -0.958 
  (0.496) (0.967) (0.497) (1.111) 
Wave yes yes yes yes 
Observations 18,782 18,782 18,782 18,782 
N_clust 27 27 27 27 
Sig: *<.10; **<.05 ***<.01; Robust standard errors  
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Table 3: Discouraged Borrowers - 28 EU Countries 
Dependent Variables: Do not apply for credit and Discouraged Borrowers; Variables of interest: Index for tax support to entrepreneurial firms; 
Index for the government support policies; 
Control Variables: firm dimension (dummies for micro, small and medium firms); age of the firm (dummy for younger than 2 years, 2–5 years, 
5–9 years); Source of funding used (dummy for use of equity, retained earnings, trade credit, leasing/factoring, bank, other); change in the labor 
costs (increase, stable, decrease); change in turnover (increase, stable, decrease); firm innovativeness in process; firm other innovativeness (use 
any type of innovation); firm’s growth rate (dummy for high-growth-rate firms); Business Angels or Venture Capital involvement (dummy if BA 
or VC are shareholders of the firm); bank support (dummy about whether the bank is supportive); Firm sophistication (number of alternative 
sources of finance used), pressing problems (amount of general challenges that the firm is facing); Firm’s perceived economic outlook; Firm 
creditworthiness; Bank perceived economic outlook; Economic outlook (change in the GDP); Demand for credit (as a ratio of the firms 
demanding credit among all firms); Firm’s short-term credit needs; firm’s long-term credit needs. 


















GEM - Tax advantages for entrepreneurship -0.112 -0.340   
 (0.165) (0.330)   
GEM - Government support for entrepreneurship   -0.106 -0.359 
      (0.150) (0.338) 
Dummy micro firm 0.255*** 0.314*** 0.254*** 0.313*** 
 (0.0666) (0.0489) (0.0657) (0.0476) 
Dummy small firm 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.137*** 0.133*** 
 (0.0448) (0.0505) (0.0444) (0.0507) 
Dummy medium firm 0.0291 0.00903 0.0294 0.00791 
  (0.0514) (0.0517) (0.0514) (0.0524) 
Dummy age up to 2 yrs. 0.0935 -0.0624 0.0941 -0.0577 
 (0.155) (0.147) (0.155) (0.149) 
Dummy age 2 to 5 yrs. -0.0277 0.141* -0.0287 0.144* 
 (0.0342) (0.0734) (0.0347) (0.0746) 
Dummy age 5 to 10 yrs. 0.0206 0.103 0.0162 0.104 
  (0.0366) (0.0660) (0.0368) (0.0669) 
Equity 0.0341 0.175 0.0313 0.178 
 (0.0803) (0.160) (0.0797) (0.160) 
Retained profits -0.112*** -0.116** -0.112*** -0.119** 
 (0.0291) (0.0577) (0.0292) (0.0583) 
Trade credit -0.0369 -0.0687 -0.0498 -0.0703 
 (0.0512) (0.0597) (0.0458) (0.0580) 
Leasing and factoring 0.155*** 0.0337 0.160** 0.0351 
 (0.0601) (0.0395) (0.0622) (0.0398) 
Bank loans -1.594*** -0.429*** -1.597*** -0.429*** 
 (0.0502) (0.135) (0.0502) (0.134) 
Other loans -0.0782 0.293*** -0.0719 0.292*** 
  (0.0649) (0.0810) (0.0674) (0.0818) 
Labor cost change -0.00389 -0.0893** -0.00336 -0.0882** 
 (0.0208) (0.0398) (0.0198) (0.0401) 
Turnover change -0.000292 -0.0497 0.00153 -0.0495 
  (0.0234) (0.0356) (0.0233) (0.0355) 
Firms involved in new process development -0.0429** 0.0436 -0.0455** 0.0417 
 (0.0210) (0.0450) (0.0218) (0.0457) 
Firms involved in other innovation -0.0814 0.0698 -0.0776 0.0722* 
 (0.0562) (0.0438) (0.0571) (0.0431) 
Firms with high growth rate -0.0849*** 0.0817 -0.0920*** 0.0823 
  (0.0244) (0.0620) (0.0246) (0.0632) 
Firms with BA_VC investors 0.106*** -0.00894 0.106*** -0.00612 
 (0.0302) (0.0668) (0.0299) (0.0681) 
Firms with Bank support 0.0718*** -0.516*** 0.0720*** -0.520*** 
  (0.0262) (0.0544) (0.0252) (0.0535) 
Financial Sophistication -0.000199 0.0236* 0.000664 0.0241* 
 (0.00733) (0.0135) (0.00724) (0.0136) 
Pressing problems 0.00257 0.00682*** 0.00299 0.00667*** 
 (0.00243) (0.00207) (0.00211) (0.00210) 
Firm perception of economic outlook  -0.0621* 0.0904*** -0.0639** 0.0910*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0324) (0.0326) (0.0323) 
Firm creditworthiness -0.0297 -0.103** -0.0262 -0.102** 
  (0.0413) (0.0455) (0.0420) (0.0457) 
General economic outlook -0.0156 -0.144** -0.0135 -0.144** 
 (0.0174) (0.0680) (0.0176) (0.0685) 
Change in GDP 0.0166 0.0296** 0.0166* 0.0304** 
 (0.0106) (0.0136) (0.00870) (0.0137) 
Demand of credit -3.337*** 0.990*** -3.274*** 1.023*** 
  (0.371) (0.354) (0.310) (0.356) 
The firm needs additional short-term finance -0.126***  -0.128***  
 (0.0381)  (0.0395)  
The firm needs additional long-term finance -0.539***  -0.540***  
  (0.0303)   (0.0304)   
Constant 2.584*** -1.719* 2.579*** -1.530 
  (0.494) (0.955) (0.493) (1.087) 
Wave yes yes yes yes 
Observations 18,782 18,782 18,782 18,782 
N_clust 27 27 27 27 















































A1: Two-Stage Residual Inclusion regressions - endogeneity test. 
Dependent Variables: Credit Obtained and Discouraged 
Variables of interest: Index for tax support to entrepreneurial firms; Index for the government support policies; Debt to GDP ratio, Inflation 
rate, Debt to GDP ratio residuals and Inflation rate residuals. 
Control Variables (included but not reported): firm dimension (dummies for micro, small and medium firms); age of the firm (dummy for 
younger than 2 years, 2–5 years, 5–9 years); Source of funding used (dummy for use of equity, retained earnings, trade credit, leasing/factoring, 
bank, other); change in the labor costs (increase, stable, decrease); change in turnover (increase, stable, decrease); firm innovativeness in 
process; firm other innovativeness (use any type of innovation); firm’s growth rate (dummy for high-growth-rate firms); Business Angels or 
Venture Capital involvement (dummy if BA or VC are shareholders of the firm); bank support (dummy about whether the bank is supportive); 
Firm sophistication (number of alternative sources of finance used), pressing problems (amount of general challenges that the firm is facing); 
Firm’s perceived economic outlook; Firm creditworthiness; Bank perceived economic outlook; Economic outlook (change in the GDP); 
Demand for credit (as a ratio of the firms demanding credit among all firms); Firm’s short-term credit needs; firm’s long-term credit needs) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Obtain Credit 
Model GEM - 
Tax advantage 
Obtain Credit 















GEM - tax burden for entrepreneurial firms 173.6***  -80.60***  
 (14.27)  (3.628)  
GEM - Government support for entrepreneurship  79.42***  -69.13*** 
    (5.517)   (4.354) 
Debt_GDP 0.00276 0.000199 0.00337 0.00357 
 (0.00337) (0.00250) (0.00256) (0.0177) 
Inflation rate (year) -0.0329 0.0932 -0.0278 0.0219 
 (0.154) (0.0830) (0.0708) (0.0533) 
Tax advantage_residuals -173.6***  80.66***  
 (14.24)  (3.711)  
Gov Support_residuals  -79.20***  69.36*** 
  (5.501)  (4.343) 
Constant -488.7*** -231.7*** 218.8*** 194.4*** 
 (40.42) (15.76) (10.07) (12.34) 
Wave  Yes Yes Yes yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes yes 
Observations 6,634 6,634 12,148 12,148 
r2_p 0.950 0.821 0.611 0.716 
N_clust 27 27 27 27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
 
